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Austrian Manufacturing Firms Abroad - The Last 100 Years 
CHRISTIAN BELLAK 
University of Economics, Vie1111a 
ABSTRACT 
This article assesses the last 100 years of Austrian Foreign Direct Investment, focusing on the 
territory of today's Austria. Periods up to 1960 are based on company surveys and case 
studies, thereafter macro-data have been used. Unlike many other small and large countries in 
Europe, which show a continuity of FDJ development and MNEs, Austria is a case of 
discontinuity and change. Some reasons are: the change of her geographical size after WWI 
and the paucity of investment; the loss of FDJ and consequently of markets and goodwill 
especially after WWII; the disruption and destruction of her economy during the wars; the 
close relationship between banking and industry, affecting FDJ of the manufacturing sector 
negatively in periods of banks' crisis; the Anschluss and confiscation of her foreign assets 
during WWII; the 'imposed' restructuring of industry during WWII; the repeated reorientation 
from Central and East Europe to new markets; the relatively large state-ownership after 
WWII; and the relatively small size of Austrian MNEs in international terms, which makes 
them vulnerable to external change and less regionally flexible than their competitors. A 
comparison with other small countries revealed the inter-relation of inward and outward FDI, 
the former being more important for Austria's industrial development during all periods. Only 
in the early 1990s Austria gained an FDJ position reflecting her high level of development. 
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Today, some small, highly developed countries m Europe are home countries to large 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). E.g. Dutch, Swedish, Belgian and Swiss MNEs look back on 
long periods of growth, many of them being older than a century. Austria, as a geographical 
entity of today, never had large MNEs and even today only few firms are MN Es of relevant size 
and scope (i.e. as international competitors in regional and structural terms). 
Internationalisation is a parallel, intertwined process of firm and state activity': Macro- 
internationalisation is defined as the (political and economic) integration of a state via an 
international treaty and ranges from a free-trade agreement, a customs union, a single market to 
an economic and monetary union. Micra-intemationalisation is defined as exporting and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) by firms located as outsiders to an integrated community. Macro- and 
micro-intemationalisation interact positively or negatively, since both types change the relative 
cost-position and the international competitiveness of the firms affected. 
*************Figure 1 about here 
The level of barriers determine the path of intemationalisation of a country2: the higher the 
barriers, the more micro-intemationalisation in the form of FDI ( e.g. tariff jumping) compared to 
trade is necessary and vice versa. In general micro-integration (which is trade and FDI with 
barriers) is a second best tool to utilize fully and quickly the integration potential of macro- 
integration (without barriers ). lt is conceivable that the effects of macro-internationalisation will 
be the more advantageous for a firm the more micro-intemationalised it has been prior to macro- 
intemationalisation. Such firms will have substantially lower adaptation costs and already have 
some experience in the integrated market. Already existing FDI may be more quickly relocated 
or restructured than starting 'from scratch'. Since smallness of a country leads to various 
constraints for development3 the aim of small, not fully macro-intemationalised statcs like Austria 
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is to overcome these constraints via micro-intemationalisation. Exporting is one of the strategies 
to achieve R&D-cost recoupment and economies of scale by extending the home market. Y et, in 
a world of trade distortions exporting may not be a sufficient strategy. Therefore, FDI may 
substitute for trade and help to overcome entry barriers as weil as serve other motives (strategic 
asset seeking, agglomeration seeking etc.). 
This article gives a descriptive assessment of the broad trends of Austria's 
internationalisation via FDI on a rather aggregate level, since it covers 100 years.4 In particular, 
the article seeks to show how and why Austria's intemationalisation path deviates from that of 
other (small) countries.5 Part of the explanation lies in historical factors: On the micro-level it is 
a question of discontinuity and change of firms' operations. On the macro-level it is a question of 
how over time changing political boundaries and politico-economic environments affect the 
course of outward FDI. This section reviews briefly definitions, data and information sources. 
The various sub-periods of Austria's FDI are described in sections II ( 1870-1918), IV (1919-59) 
and V ( 1960 to present), which also provide several examples of Austrian MNEs. Section III 
compares the outward and inward FDI position of Austria with other small countries and section 
VI discusses the results and draws some conclusions. 
Some definitions at the beginning: The Austro-Hungarian monarchy (subsequently 
referred to as the Empire) consists of an Austrian part and a Hungarian part (see Figure 2). Tue 
Austrian part of the Empire or Cislithania comprises Altösterreich ( esp. Sudetenland) and the 
later Republic of Austria, which is approximately today's Austria. Consequently, the definition of 
outward FDI is those investments which were set up or acquired outside Austria's territory 
(including also 'Austrian' investments in Hungary during the Empire) for the whole period of 
analysis, i.e. 1870-1994. 
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****** Figure 2 about here 
FDJ consists of greenfield investments and acquisitions and figures given in this text refer to the 
Austrian manufacturing sector's FDJ, i.e. sales subsidiaries, assembling and production abroad. 
Cornpared to the history of banks, the Austrian manufacturing sector is far less well documented, 
even the more so with regard to FDI, since international consolidation rules did not exist and 
other reports on subsidiaries (e.g. notification of capital transfer) were not compulsory. Thus, a 
representative data set on Austrian FDI ( capital transfers) is not available before the 1960s, hence 
case studies and firm-based information have been used for this period. Moreover, before WWII, 
the statistical material does not allow to seperate 'direct' from 'portfolio' investment on a 
consistent basis. Thus, using capital figures on FDI for the early period may lead to flawed 
conclusions about the real extent of multinationalisation. The coverage of the early periods of 
Austrian FDI is not very different from other small and large country studies.6 The long-term 
nature ofthis article irnplies, that micro- and macro-economic information has tobe combined to 
get a more realistic picture of FDI, rather than using a single, coherent level of analysis for all 
periods. Data on firms are taken from Mathis', company reports, surveys8 and in-depth case 
studies about seventeen of the most prominent large Austrian investors abroad this author 
undertook during 1989.9 Besides, a survey of literature on Austrian FDI has been published by 
this author" which includes all sources available on the various aspects of Austrian FDI as of end 
of 1994. Tue survey by Mathis is confined to firms on the territory of today's Austria.11 Thus, in 
this article, the intemationalisation process of firms in Austria can be followed from 1870 to 
1994, i.e. about 120 years are covered on the basis of different data and for some periods 
benchmark-year data are available only. Data on capital transfers for FDI are taken either from 
balance of payments (BoP) or from the survey of the National Bank (i.e. book values). In ward 
FDI is taken into account only as far as it is relevant for outward FDI. 
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II 
This subsection discusses Austrian FDI pre-1919, i.e. during the Empire and gives examples of 
finns with FDI. The quantitative basis of industrialisation of the Austrian part of the Empire is 
rather vague, still 12 and figures on GDP growth vary by author. There is, however, widespread 
consensus that the heterogenous level of development of the various parts of Cislithania is 
reflected in regional growth-differentials. For today's Austria, real GDP growth is estirnated 
1.35 per cent annually from 1830- 70 and 2.41 per cent from 1870-191313 and thus higher than 
in the other parts of the Empire and in accordance with other countries in Europe at that time. 
The industrial development of Austria is characterised by a secondarisation of employrnent at 
the turn ofthe century. In 1869 24.8 per cent, in 1910 32.2 per cent andin 1951 38.8 percent 
of employment can be attributed to the secondary sector", while employment in the primary 
sector decreased from 54.2 to 32.6 per cent during this period. A detailed analysis of early 
Austrian industrial growth can be found in Rudolph". Total industrial output grew at 2.5 per 
cent annually from 1830-1913 and at 3.1 per cent p.a. from 1890-1913. Mathis" from bis 
1987 study calculated various concentration measures and concluded that in 1910-13 20 per 
cent of total active population was employed in large-scale companies (i.e. firms with more 
than 1,000 employees). The average employment in these firms was 2,485. With the exception 
of the wars, concentration increased with the expansion of the secondary sector in Austria. 
Among the largest companies (by employment) were Blumau (explosives, 20,000), Alpine 
(iron, steel, 17,000), Austria Tabak (tobacco, 10,000), Siemens-Schuckert (electronics, 
6,000), Steyr (arms 6,500), Berndorf(metal, 5,000) and Böhler (iron and steel, 5,000). 
The regional structure of the domestic industry and its change during the Empire was 
rnainly determined by the emerging infrastructure (especially railways), by the spread of energy- 
supply and, like today, by new production methods which used different or less r-sources. E.g., 
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iron ore, paper and glass industries restructured along the lines of new materials and technologies 
either to or away from big towns. In addition, new suppliers of resources ( e.g. from overseas) as 
weil as new sourcing strategies of firms put severe pressure on local suppliers. The growth of 
firms, especially the importance of the joint-stock companies iAktiengesellschaften'I) led to 
agglomeration effects. 18 Attracted by the large firms, related and supporting industries tended to 
condense these clusters. But even the large firms were not MNEs, but rather acted on a large, 
autarkic home market (with many regional barriers and regulations still). Yet, the industrial 
restructuring and relocation of plants in the Austrian part of the Empire at the turn of the century 
was only partly determined by comparati ve cost resulting from the existing di vision of labour. 19 
Rather, a slow restructuring process and the concentration in traditional industrial areas by some 
industries, which did not relocate plants despite the deterioration of certain location factors was 
discernible. Historie and social ties played an extremely important role - especially in industries 
with a high level of development - and led to a low mobility of some firms." Tue regional spread 
of firms was also a product of government intervention. For example, after 1867 the ethnic 
tensions between Austria and Hungary led inter alia to a Hungarian policy of industrial 
development, which tried to protect the Hungarian markets against Austrian products. The far- 
reaching subsidies for greenfield investments in Hungary led to a massive re-location of firms.21 
The industrialisation process was thus mainly 'home-made' in a rather autarkic market and 
irnportant MNEs did not emerge. Outward FDI was partly resource-seeking, partly market- 
seeking with little importance of production abroad. 
Out ofthe 189 largest Austrian industrial firms with more than 1,000 employees, which 
existed in 1913, only 19 invested greenfield abroad and only 17 acquired firms abroad at the turn 
of the century. 48 firms had some form of sales subsidiaries abroad." The importance of the few 
rnanufacturing subsidiaries abroad reported was even less than the numbers suggest, since most 
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of them were not based on strategic management decisions but rather on chance. Mathis23 
concludes that the large home market of the Empire partly explains the relative unimportance of 
Austrian FDJ and the difference to countries like Sweden and Switzerland. Only 16 firms from 
Austria (some of them partly or fully foreign owned) engaged in manufacturing activities in 
Hungary (among them Semperit, Siemens-Schuckert, Schrack-Ericsson). 
********* Table 1 about here 
Three sub-groups of Austrian outward investors can be distinguished since the late nineteenth 
century: 
(a) Austrian firms which were early outward investors but were taken over by a foreign 
firm at some point of time: ÖSPAG (porcelain), founded in 1883, which acquired R. Ditmars 
Erben in Znaim in 1910 (which was under Austrian management) and Brüder Urbach in Teplitz 
in 1912; then after 1938 ÖSPAG belonged to the Creditanstalt and was sold to the Swiss Laufen 
Holding in 1967 by which it is owned stiII24; Schrack (electro(nics)), founded in 1872, had a 
production unit in Budapest as early as 1897 and was sold to Ericsson in 1912 (with participation 
of the Credit Anstalt). lt was sold back to Mr. Schrack in 1938 and again concluded a licensing 
agreement with Ericsson in 1970, when subsequently the cooperation was intensified, leading to 
a partial takeover by Ericsson a few years ago. In 1995, the Schrack family sold their remaining 
share.25 
(b) Austrian firms, whicli were early outward investors and still are today: Wienerberger 
(construction material, bricks), founded in 1775, it was one of the largest Austrian firms in the 
nineteenth century and set up production units in Hungary as early as 1838 and 1853. Before 
WWI, its market share was 54 per cent, which increased to 84 per cent during the war. 
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Remaining participations abroad were sold shortly after 1918. After WWII, the expansion abroad 
was continued and acquisitions abroad led to a dominant market position in Germany and 
production units in France and recently also in Hungary; Plansee (metallurgy), founded in 1921. 
Its owner, Mr. Schwarzkopf, personally set up many firms in Germany, England, the Netherlands 
and the US. The Schwarzkopf Development Corporation in New York, founded in 1929, still 
exists today as well as the Schwarzkopf Technology Corporation, Lowland Plant, Holliston 
(Mass.), a production subsidiary. Some firms were sold at some point of time and are now 
competitors to Plansee," Böhler (metal), has been intemationally active for more than l 00 
years." E.g. in 1881, a sales subsidiary was set up in Switzerland, which still exists today. Several 
foreign production units were acquired and after WWII Böhler became part of the nationalised 
industry (ÖJAG). Recently, the acquisition of Uddeholm (a Swedish firm) makes Böhler a leading 
supplier of high-grade steel in Europe. 
(c) Austrian firms, which already existed for a lang time, yet are latecomers as foreign 
investors (thus relying mainly on exporting and domestic markets so far): Radex (magnesite), 
founded as the Austro-American Magnesite Company in 1908, this firm was foreign owned until 
a management buy-out in 1987. Since the finn's location depends on the raw-material, despite the 
American ownerhip still after WWII (General Refractories Comp., Phil.) this firm was regarded 
as an Austrian firm, rather than a foreign subsidiary. Resource seeking motives led to a FDI in 
Greece in the 1950s and several other participations.28 Neuman ( aluminum), founded in 1780, the 
firm engaged in FDI only in 1984. In 1880 the firm went bankrupt and moved from iron to sheet- 
zinc production. Parts of the firm were liquidated in 1918, when Bohemian and Hungarian 
markets were lost. In 1947, the firm moved into aluminum production, where it still is today. In 
1981 the firm was overtaken by the German Tubex Group. Starting in 1984, Neuman acquired 
production units abroad, e.g. in Germany, US, Danmark and Spain." Mayr-Melnhof(wood, pulp 
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and paper), founded in 1913, grew through domestic investments, the first acquisition abroad 
came in Gerrnany only in 1984, other foreign production units followed. Tue company today is 
one of the world's largest manufacturer of recycled cardboard and very active in foreign 
acquisitions; Frantschach (paper), founded in 1881, only in the 1980s very quickly expanded 
abroad and gained a dominant market position in some segments in Europe and the US, after a 
long phase of domestic growth when it eventually became one of the largest industrial complexes 
in Austria in 1988; Umdasch ( construction material), founded in 1868, first FDI abroad in the 
1960s, only has foreign sales subsidiaries, while production is still concentrated in Austria today; 
Swarovski (glass etc.), founded in 1895, had a distribution and sales network abroad for a long 
tirrie, yet production abroad rnainly after WWII. Today, the firm has 9,200 employees worldwide, 
and is thus the third largest manufacturing firm in Austria, and it has participations in 13 
production units abroad and 44 sales subsidiaries worldwide." 
Turning to foreign capital's role for Austria's industrial development before WWl, it was 
smaller than in subsequent periods, with the exception of the electronics industry, which was 
always foreign dominated. Out of the 74 firms surveyed by Mathis, only 13 were foreign owned 
(British, Hungarian, Swedish, American, German). Measured by employees they had a 24 per 
cent share in total employment only; when taking all firrns above 1,000 employees surveyed, 
which existed in 1913 as a basis and this share drops even to 13 per cent, when taking the 7 4 
firms as a basis. Examples for in ward investors at the turn of the century are Siemens-Schuckert 
(founded in 1873 and set up a subsidiary abroad in Vienna 1875); in 1896-7, Schuckert bought 
a Viennese factory and transforrned it in the Österreichische Schuckert-Werke AG with the 
participation ofthe Böhmische Unionsbank; AEG (which produced in Austria-Hungary and e.g., 
took over the Union-Elektrizitätsgesellschaft; which had a production unit in Austria). Before 
WWI, FDI in Europe were, among others, stimulated by policy measures. Tariff jumping was an 
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important motivation (46 per cent ofresponses) for inward FDI by investors from five European 
countries surveyed by Schröter." Market-growth was another major motive. Both motives apply 
in the case ofthe Empire although the absolute numbers of in ward FDI from the small countries 
remained low, increasing steadily from 1870: one to 1900: 12 and 1914: 20. At first glance, this 
suggests a limited importance of foreign FDI for the industrial development of the Empire. 32 Y et, 
taking into account the substantial transfer of technology via FDI into the Empire, comparable 
even to the Finish or Russian situation", these few FDI were an important, but not decisive 
growth factor (see also next section). 
III 
Although it is difficult to compare small countries in general, Austria has often been compared 
in historical and economic terms to countries like Sweden, Switzerland and Finland.34 Their 
limited home market, their general resource shortage with the exception of wood, their 
reputation in agriculture and their high dependence on foreign trade were common features, 
while their location ( central vs. northern Europe ), their size and their level of (industrial) 
development in the late nineteenth century differed. Small countries show quite a 
heterogenous pattern of FDI.35 While Switzerland and Belgium have been home countries of 
many large MNEs for decades, Sweden, Finland and Austria were Jatecomers in 
internationalisation. This subsection seeks to contrast the Austrian experience with that of 
Finland up to 1990 and with other small countries from 1870-1914. 
In a comparison ofFinland's and Austria's FDJ36, various points have been highlighted for 
the period after WWII, which is extended backwards here on the basis of the information given 
above for Austria and on Hjerppe, Ahvenainen37 for Finish inward FDJ, since outward FDI was 
not of any relevance until the late 1950s. I deal with outward FDJ first and then continue with a 
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somewhat lengthy discussion of inward FDI in order to conclude with the interrelation of in ward 
and outward FDI. 
Regarding outward FDI, the relatively low level of (industrial) development and the high 
share of agriculture in Finland were the rnain economic causes for the lack of FDI during Russian 
autonomy ( 1809-1917). While before and after 1918, outward FDI was of some significance for 
Austrian firms, due to the changing boundaries, no such development can be found in Finland. 
Tue quick industrialisation process in Finland and Austria after WWII, both countries having a 
large state-owned industrial sector, led to a somewhat earlier and stronger engagement of Finish 
compared to Austrian finns abroad", where finns mainly relied on exporting for reasons given 
below. Y et, the overall trend was similar in both countries. 
Concerning inward FDI developments in both countries were very different from the 
1870s onwards. Summarising the Austrian case, which was occasionally referred to above, during 
the Empire and imrnediately after WWI the influx of foreign finns was low", the market was 
autarkic before the war and the foreign influence was mainly through the know-how of single 
persons or entrepreneurs, which were attracted e.g., from Germany, England and Bohemia. 
Mathis concludes that '... foreign investment was less important for the beginning of 
industrialisation, but that it very much helped to sustain the process once it had started.:" After 
WWI, the heavy duties did not eucourage much inward FDI, most likely mainly for political 
reasons and the concentration on domestic issues in the now independent states.41 With WWII 
approaching, a systematic and planned growth of in ward FDI occurrcd, resulting in a take-over 
of most parts of Austria's industrial sector by the Nazi-regime. Foreign takeovers increased 
threefold compared to the pre-WWI period and 27 per cent ofthe 49 companies with more than 
1,000 employees in 1937 were subsidiaries offoreign firms (the pre-war level was 14 per cent, 
see below 'inter-war period').42 After WWII, when Austria regained its national souvereignty and 
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got back her industry, Gerrnan capital moved in in order to profit from the underutilised Austrian 
capital stock. Despite the experience of the Anschluss there was no resistance or opposition 
against Gerrnan capital immediately after the war. On the contrary, the government soon realised 
that it should promote inward FDJ which was put into action from the 1960s and extended 
continuously until today. Tue share offoreign capital grew rapidly, and eventually (mid-1970s) 
ownership in Austrian industry was roughly one third for each, i.e. the private, the foreign and the 
state-owned Austrian sector (measured by equity). Thus, unlike outward FDI, inward FDJ has 
been of a very relevant size and importance for technology transfer and employment in Austria. 
Tue story is completely different for Finland, as to the amount of inward FDI and the 
view of the government: Inward FDI has been relatively insignificant for over a century, and 
from the early stages of industrialisation important sectors and resources were protected against 
foreign participation by law (so called 'closed sectors').43 Around the turn of the century, foreign 
investors were not interested in Finland, since the standard of living was lower than in most 
European countries, the market was small and remote, the language difficult and not least 
because of the restrictive laws introduced from 1883 onwards. Some Russian entrepreneurs 
owned a number of iron works during the 1870s. There also' ... invested a lot of Swedish and 
Norwegian pulp and paper firms in wood licences in Russia (including Finland)' before 191444• 
There were two kinds of in ward investors: First single persons (like in the Empire): ' ... the input 
of foreign experts, supervisors and skilled workers was significant at the early stages of 
industrialisation, and it was typical that these men were without means.'" Second, foreign finns 
like the Norwegian Gut:::eit&Co., the Swedish Halla AB, which were among the ten largest firms 
in Finland before WWJ, can be regarded as subsidiaries of MNEs. The motivation for FDI was 
partly tariff-jumping. Y et, 'only a few of the foreign businesses were successful in Finland'.46 
Unlike Austria, Finland developed a strong nationalistic position after 1917 ( independence) and 
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by the end of the 1920s further restrictions on foreign ownership were imposed to secure Finish 
resources. In the inter-war years, foreign capital decreased sharply and the nationalistic stance 
was put into practice by nationalisation of large parts of the industry, a scenario which occurred 
in Austria only after WWII and for other reasons. For the inter-war period Hjerppe, Ahvenainen 
mention some examples of new inward investors, among them Solvay & Cie, Vereinigte 
Farbenfabriken, Unilever and AEG. Since legislation was not changed after WWII, the share of 
foreign capital remained on a low level, only trade liberalisation opened Finish markets for 
foreign firms via imports. Summarising the Finish development, inward and outward FDI were 
not a driving (in terms of capital investment), yet not a negligible (in terms of know-how transfer) 
factor between the 1870s and 1970s. 
The different paths of inward FDI in both countries have important implications for 
outward FDI:' Since the main sectors in Finland were domestically owned for almost a century, 
they developed an inward looking strategy until the 1980s. Y et, when it became clear that 
outward FDI were necessary to survive in international markets, the domestic ownership was an 
advantage, since together with the nationalised sector, firms developed a 'Finish strategy' of 
intemationalisation. In Austria, where main industries were dominated by foreign firms ( e.g. the 
electro(nics) industry since the late 19th century), such firms as well as the nationalised sector 
were not interested in outward FDI for various reasons given below. They did not pull each other 
abroad as in the Finish case", but rather followed risk-averse, exporting strategies. Concluding, 
despite some structural parallels of the domestic economies, their intemationalisation via inward 
FDI was remarkably different, only the fact that they were latecomers in outward FDI applies to 
both countries. 
The sudden change of the size of the Empire after WWI also involves the questions, if 
Austria's MNEs show the characteristics oflarge or small country firms and if their characteristics 
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changed over time. One could hypothesize that up to WWI Austria's MNEs should reflect the 
characteristics of American, French or British finns and those of Belgian, Swedish, Finish or 
Danish MNEs thereafter. A tentative answer, which is substantiated in what follows, would be 
that Austria's MNEs showed the characteristics of typical small country MNEs during the last 
100 years despite the change of country size. We have seen earlier that at the turn of the century, 
Austrian firms were concentrated on their home market and there were few incentives to invest 
abroad. Tue study by Schröter, who surveyed 60 .tvlNEs of five European countries with 400 FDI 
between 1870 and 1914, allows us to cornpare certain distinctive features of small country versus 
large country MNEs to the Austrian case": (i) In 46 per cent of responses, policy measures like 
tariffs stimulated FDI of the five countries before WWI. During and also after the Empire 
Austrian firms invested abroad to gain from tax concessions, to jump tariffs etc. FDI were thus 
distorted by government policy measures from that time onwards and at no time developed under 
free-market rules. (ii) Tue industrial distribution of Austrian FDI was very stable in the times of 
the Empire (and still is even today). Surprisingly, the same fact is also reported by Schröter": 
The industrial distribution ' ... was mainly stable until the 1960s with the exception of the textile 
industry.' (iii) Most FDI from the five small countries were located in 'mentally close' countries'", 
a feature which is also true for Austrian FDI during the Empire andin later periods as well. (iv) 
Tue strong role of banks, both for in ward and outward FDI during the Empire can also be found 
in other small countries, although to a lesser extent.51 The main differences between the Empire 
and the five small countries were, of course, (i) the size of the home market52, which partly 
explains the lack ofFDI ofthe Empire and (ii) the size of the investing firms, yet results are quite 
inconclusive. Schröter" on the one hand writes that the MNEs were smaller than the average, yet 
on the other hand concludes that ' ... the MN Es were among the largest finns in the respective 
countries'. 54 Tue latte. would apply to the structure of firms in the Empire as well. Summarising, 
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despite its large size, the few MNEs of the Empire seem to parallel most of the European small 
country characteristics of MNEs, at least more than those of US or British large scale MNEs. 
This suggests for the late 19th and early 20th century it is probably more accurate to speak about 
a Continental versus Anglo-american model of FDI than of a small versus large country model. 55 
IV 
This subsection describes FDI in the inter-war period, the economic conditions in Austria after 
WWI and the strategies of Austrian firms in the new environment, distinguishing two 
subperiods: the post-WWI period up to 1929 (Depression) and the pre-war and WWII period. 
lt ends with a short assessment of the post WWII economic environment. 
Tue post-WWI period certainly was a shock for Austria in economic terms, since her size 
shrank to about 35· per cent of its former territory (entire Austro-Hungarian monarchy) or as 
Georges Clemenceau put it 'Austria is what is left over'. During the Empire, Austria was the third 
largest country in Europe measured by population (50 mn) and the second largest country 
measured by size (677,000 km'), Tue dissolution of the Empire meant a disruption of a centuries- 
old inter-regional division of labour", the distortion of the currency union, and the splitting up of 
a huge market. Questions about the economic viability were raised? as Austria is an example for 
a country of 50 million inhabitants that after WWI 'suddenly shrunk to an independent country of 
some 6.5 million inhabitants'.58 The destruction of the Empire in turn interrupted the growth 
process of rnany large firrns. Y et, contrary to the common belief at the time" that Austria would 
not survive, analyses of the economic history revealed that Austria recovered very quickly from 
this shock." 'lt could be said, of course, that these are conditions, every small economy as for 
exarnple Switzerland must face, but in the case of Austria the situation was new, unprecedented 
and aggravated by the war.'?' Today, there is no doubt that Austria had inherited the highly 
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developed parts of the Empire and was an industrial state.62 While Butschek'" mentions the lack 
of food, energy and raw rnaterials as limiting factors, Matis refers to the fuel shortage as 'the only 
serious weakness of Austria's post-war economic structure.:" Yet, for the domestic economy 
'one has to conclude that Austria's industry was unable to utilize her relatively overproportionate 
industrial inheritance from the Habsburg monarchy; that is, she was unable to build upon it by 
undertaking the necessary structural changes. Or, expressed in a different way, the existing 
potential productive forces could not effectively develop because of the paucity of investrnent' .65 
This had an impact on the foreign operations of the finns. The in view of the situation 
rather favourable domestic conditions immediately after the war affected the strategies of 
Austrian firms, which - like the whole country - had to cope with a new situation: domestic trade 
flows were suddenly turned into exports;" nationalistic tendencies in .he successor states, the 
former 'home market', had to be faced; and the finns had to restructure their whole activities. 
After the industrial finns had realised that manufacturing within the Empire was fundamentally 
different from multinational manufacturing (it was not just simply transferring former domestic 
plants into foreign subsidiaries), they could in principle pursue two strategies67: first, restructuring 
to supply the domestic market or second, multinationalisation of activities. In praxi, the latter 
alternative was mostly chosen with different rates of success", since the former would have 
implied the loss of markets and of resources and a downscaling of activities. Tue 
multinationalisation strategy meant that FDI in the early inter-war period increased sharply. 
Between 1914 and 193 7 out of the 189 largest industrial firms in Austria only 21 invested 
greenfield abroad and 29 acquired finns abroad. 44 finns had some form of sales subsidiaries 
abroad.69 (For number of production subsidiaries, see Table l .) Schröter reaches sirnilar 
conclusions about the role of Austrian FDI in the inter-war period: 'After the Empire had been 
broken up in 1918/l 9, much more fdi placed nearby - purely by chance was to be found. In 
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consequence ofthe drawing of new borders, many plants which used tobe within the monarchy 
happened to be situated abroad in 1919. However, a weak Austrian economy, inflation and a 
policy of nostrification in the successor states, especially in Czechoslovakia, caused that many of 
such cases of fdi by chance were sold.:" Banks, which played a substantial role in the 
manufacturing sector both as financiers and as shareholders sold off their subsidiaries as well as 
their shares in the industrial firms in the now foreign countries.71 One could hypothesize that the 
loss of home territory might have led to a stronger engagement of Austrian firms in production 
abroad. Mathis" qualifies the fact this has not happened by mentioning (i) the new borders which 
'automatically' increase the number ofFDI in the former home market; (ii) many subsidiaries were 
soon sold-off during the world economic crisis; (iii) many greenfield investments did not last very 
long: and (iv) many FDI were minority shareholdings. 
A different, more positive view about this hypothesis is expressed by Matis. He describes 
the strategies Austrian manufacturing firms followed 'which bad been purely national (in the sense 
of the Monarchy as a whole) until 1918, were now forced to turn into 'multi-nationals', if they 
wished to retain their markets, now belonging to the successor states'.73 A first strategy was to 
set up holding companies abroad in order to surmount the nationalistic attitude of the successor 
states. 74 A second strategy was the formation of cartels, of which before the war 200 extisted", 
e.g. in steel production or in the paper industry, where 'the Austrian based trusts controlled most 
ofthe manufacturing in the successor states.:" A third strategy was toset up subsidiaries in the 
successor states in order to secure resources and markets ( or to overcome tariffs ), like the 
Austrian Alpine Montan Company and Bohlet did. Apart from the history of single firms Matis 
assessed the question if Austrian firms were able to keep (some) of their pre-WWI capital 
participations in the new states on the basis of a sample of 50 firms." He concludes that in the 
field of industrial joint-stock companies nearly 70 per cent of the pre-war Austrian capital 
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influence continued to prevail, e.g. the Austrian metal industry was able to preserve its pre-war 
position to the füll extent in all observed cases, the mining industry kept its position at 60 per 
cent, the electro-technical industry even increased its influence while only in the textile industry 
Austria lost her influential position.78 Summarising, the importance of FDI for the survival and 
growth of Austrian firms was quite high and new Austrian MNEs emerged during the inter-war 
period up to 1929. 
Tue period after 1929 again brought radical changes for the Austrian economy. Although 
Austrian FDI were of no particular relevance during this period, a short description of the main 
developments is justified by their determining nature for the post-war industrial structure. Despite 
the fact that the 1929 crisis hit the manufacturing sector, not least via the banks' crisis79, the 
increasing influx of German capital in subsequent years even led to an expansion of certain 
sectors." Tue political developments accelerated the dramatic change in ownership" and led to - 
for a srnall country - atypical growth of scale-intensive, investment goods industries. These were 
irnposed extemally82, German finns exploiting the large number of highly trained yet unemployed 
Austrian workforce. This process was paralleled by a geographical shift away from the Viennese 
basin to the westem provinces.83 
Summarising, the Depression and the later part of the inter-war period 'destroyed' most 
of the capital participations Austrian firms tried to 'save' from the times of the Empire and with 
it markets, reputation and prestige of Austrian firms and products. Under the conditions 
described above, the Austrian economy lost more than it gained during this period. Since she 
rebuilt much of this 'artificially imposed' plants after WWII ( e.g. Linz steel works, Lenzing 
nitrogen plant, Ranshofen aluminum works), she disposed of a large-scale industry which 
otherwise would not have developed. One might even speculate that in the post-war Austrian 
economy more FDI and MNEs would have developed, had she restructured along the lines of her 
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traditionally grown industries. Thus, after WWII, large parts of the Austrian industry had to start 
frorn scratch again. 
Immediately after WWII large parts of the manufacturing sector in Austria, which was 
then under German ownership, were overtaken by the Allies. 84 While the French, British and 
Arnericans quickly retumed the firms to Austria, many of which were bought by 'German 
cornpanies, which produced at maxirnurn capacity and searched for complementary and 
expansionary investrnent opportunities in the below capacity working Austrian economy'" the 
Russians defined the firms in their zone as extraterritorial entities and led these firms 
themselves.86 The subsequent decision of the Austrian government to nationalise the basic 
industries as weil as the large banks was seen as a means to provide the necessary funds from the 
budget for the reconstruction and to prevent capital inflow mainly from Russia. This large 
nationalised sector - in 1966 it accounted for 31 per cent of GNP for the total economy 
(manufacturing and rnining: 25 per cent, services: 59 per cent) - slowed down FDJ growth abroad 
in later years. Austrian firms lost a large proportion of their foreign assets after the war and 
concentrated on reconstruction and reorganisation inside Austria as well as on exporting. 
V 
From the 1960s onwards there are five stages of intemationalisation discernible, which are 
described in this subsection: ( 1) Austria's EFTA mernbership with some trade discrirnination 
by the EC (1960-72); (2) Austria's EFTA membership under the EFTA-EC free-trade 
agreement (1973-7); (3) Austria's further integration from 1978-93; (4) Austria's EEA 
rnembership (1994-); (5) Austria's EU membership (1995-) and finally intemationalisation in 
East Europe from 1989 onwards.87 
After WWII the Austrian economy entered several phases of economic grcwth, which 
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more or less were driven by the performance of the exporting sector and by domestic stability. 
Tue share of mining and manufacturing in GNP was 3 8 per cent in 195088, exports mainly 
consisted of raw materials and semi-finished goods: wood, pulp and paper, iron and steel 
accounted for more than 45 per cent of total exports. In 1950 SITC 5-9 (i.e. industrial goods) 
comprised 69 per cent of total exports, a share which increased to 7 5 per cent in 1960 and more 
than 80 per cent in 1970. The fact that large parts of the domestic economy and exports were 
'inherited' from WWII led to a structural weakness of the ouput, which prevailed to a lesser 
extent until the 1980s. Despite several recessions, partly induced by international developments, 
Austria recovered quickly and rapidly caught-up with the leading countries. The real average 
annual growth-rate of GDP per capita was 3.1 per cent between 1960-90 (OECD: 2.6 per cent), 
the difference being particularly marked in 1970-80, when Austria's growth was 3.5 per cent or 
0. 7 percentage points ahead of OECD annually. A comparison of GDP and FDI growth in 
nominal terms shows that while GDP grew at eight per cent 1960-90 (seven per cent 1975-90), 
accumulatcd FDI grew at 32 per cent 1961-90 (book values of FDI 1975-90: 17 per cent) p.a. 
Thus, even in periods of lower overall growth of the Austrian economy, outward FDI grew at a 
higher rate, albeit from a low level. 
In the 1950s Austria went through a period of reconstruction and economic stabilisation. A tight 
monetary and incomes-cum-prices policy which was based on the consensus of the so-called 
social partners led to above average growth rates. Especially the Eastern parts of Austria again - 
similar to the development after WWI, yet under very different circumstances - had to reorientate 
themselves towards Central and Western European markets, since Europe split up in two large 
political blocs. This fact 'made it more difficult for these firms to compete successfully on world 
markets'.89 From the 1960s onwards, foreign trade gained importance as a determinant for growth 
and employment, thus increasing the dependence of Austria's performance on the international 
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economic environment. Overall, the stable domestic development as well as the economic policy 
created afavourable environment for exporting, so that firms had little incentives to undertake 
FDJ: firstly, the development and extension of an export risk guarantee system from 1954 
onwards reduced the risk of exporting for the companies: secondly, the political and social 
stability created an intangible competitive advantage on world markets, since there were virtually 
no strikes and only moderate, inflation-oriented wage claims by trade unions; thirdly, even in 
periods of strong growth, labour shortage did not arise"; and fourthly, a currency policy, which 
aimed at a slight overvaluation after the last devaluation of the schilling in 1969 was introduced 
from 1971 onwards with the support ofthe social partners in general. A hard currency policy was 
introduced and the schilling was pegged to the Deutschmark, which created stable conditions 
( expectations) for exporters and prevented import-induced inflation; finally, the above mentioned 
catch-up process was supported by a favourable development of the relative unit labour cost 
(RULC) position of the manufacturing sector, despite the hard currency policy, and a catch-up 
in factor productivity.91 One ofthe best indicators showing the favourable location advantages in 
Austria is the fact that inward FDI grew steadily. 
From the above it is quite conceivable that Austria's intemationalisation via FDI took only 
slow pace between 1955-87.92 The comparatively low level of Austrian FDI abroad has been 
explained inter alia by the following factors: (i) Austrian firms were able to increase their market 
share in EC via exporting, tariff-jumping via FDI was not necessary, because of the structure of 
exports, mainly semi-manufactured and investment goods: (ii) The large inward FDI reduces the 
potential for outward FDI in some industries (electro(nics) which are dominated by foreign 
subsidiaries like ABB, Ericsson, IBM, Phillips, Siemens etc.); (iii) Lack of ownership advantages 
of which the structural trade-balance deficit may be an indicator: while in 1961 only 1.3 per cent 
of Austrian exports (1991: 6.8 per cent) but 5.2 per cent of Austrian imports (1991: 12 per cent) 
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were characterised as high technology intensive, the respective figures for the OECD in 1961 for 
exports are 8.3 per cent (1991: 15.9 per cent) and for imports 5.6 per cent (1991: 14.4 per 
cent).93 (iv) Austrian Industries AG, the former ÖIAG, a conglomerate ofthe main nationalised 
manufacturing finns ( e.g. chemicals, iron and steel, aluminum, rail equipment, electronics, 
environmental technoloy, energy, machinery, industrial plants, engineering) was 'inherited' from 
WWII and earlier periods. A substantial share of this state-owned company in the manufacturing 
industry created an ideological barrier to FDI as a job-exporting mechanism up to the 1980s. 
Austrian Industries AG invested 6.4 bn ATS in 1989 and 7.4 bn ATS in 1990 and hence about 
40 per cent of total investment abroad ( even higher if only manufacturing sector is taken as a 
basis for calculation).94 Since then its relative importance as an outward investor has decreased, 
partly due to restructuring and privatisation and partly because the private sector's FDI has 
gained pace; (v) A chronically low equity-capital ratio, increasing between 1980 (19.21 per cent) 
and 1990 (22.61 per cent) only slightly. With regard to the manufacturing joint-stock companies 
the ratio fell from 1955 (56.8 per cent) to 16.4 per cent in 1981.95 (vi) The lack of a long-term 
strategic industrial policy as weil as inter-firm rivalry prevented so-called 'Austrian solutions', the 
creation oflarge conglomerates which could bear the risk of large-scale intemationalisation ( e.g. 
pulp and paper; ski equipment). The idea, which had great appeal for industrial policy makers, 
was to join finns in sectors where Austrian manufacturing firms were important competitors (i.e. 
firms with a long history and a technological advantage) in order to generate the size and 
investment volume necessary to compete on world markets and to secure Austrian ownership. 
Due to heavy competition among the firms themsclves, this idea was never realised in praxi, but 
rather the finns were mostly sold to foreign companies or went bankrupt. (e.g. Atomic, Blizzard, 
Leykam, Steyrmuhli: ( vii) Tue lack of entrepreneurs ( with few exceptions) and an efficient capital 
market (especially risk capital). (viii) A slow restructuring process at home which was partly due 
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to the fact, that the decisions of the social partners were confined to their members 
('institutionalised lobbying'), which 'may constitute a serious impediment to openmindedness, 
innovation, restructuring and intemationalisation'.96 The restructuring process was further slowed 
down by the above mentioned importance of banks as owners of main manufacturers which often 
do not act like entrepreneurs and a strong commitment to füll employment by the governrnent 
which found its expression in the subsidisation of the state-owned banks and firms.97 
Between 1938 and 1979 out ofthe same 189 largest industrial firms in Austria mentioned 
above only 25 invested greenfield abroad and 25 acquired finns abroad. 52 firms had some form 
of sales subsidiaries abroad.98 Between 1946 and 1979 the number of firms (with more than 1,000 
employees) with production subsidiaries abroad even fell below the inter-war level (see table 1), 
which was explained by Mathis" by the loss ofthe Austrian subsidiaries in Eastem Europe for the 
second time. This rnight be an explanation for the few FDJ in years immediately after WWII, but 
not for a few decades, when a new management generation took over during the 
Wirtschaftswunder (see other reasons mentioned above). By and large, unlike in earlier periods, 
some large firms developed strategies for intemationalisation. 
The period pre-1986 is marked by larger inward than outward FDJ flows in each year 
since the 1960s. (see Table 2) As a result in ward stocks were considerably larger than outward 
stocks, either measured as accumulated flows from balance of payments or as book values. (see 
Table 3) Taking the period 1980-90 inward and outward flows were balanced, inward stocks 
showing only eight per cent or one third ofthe average annual growth-rate of outward stocks (23 
per cent) albeit starting from a higher level. 
********Tables 2 and 3 about here 
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Against the international trend the manufacturing sector extended its share relative to the non- 
manufacturing (mainly service) sector between 1980 (43.3 per cent) and 1987 (66.2 per cent), 
which might partly be explained by divestments of the services sector as weil as a change in the 
long-term <lebt position, partly attributed to the lack of competition in many service subsectors. 
*******Table 4 about here 
FDI were regionally concentrated and followed mainly the export flows. EC accounted for 52 per 
cent, EFTA for 21 per cent of total nominal capital stock abroad. Germany (32.5 per cent), the 
US (16.7 per cent) and Switzerland (20.7 per cent) received 70 per cent oftotal stock in 1986. 
These countries are also the main in ward investors. E.g. German companies bad 1,373 
subsidiaries with a tumover of 213 bn A TS and 119,000 employees in Austria already in 1986. 
Outward FDI as a percentage of exports reached one per cent only recently ( 1980: 0.53 per cent; 
1985: 0.28 per cent: 1986: 1.32 per cent) confirming exports as a dominant strategy of micro- 
internationalisation. Total outward FDI flows compared to domestic investment amounted to 0.5 
per cent in 1980 and 0.4 per cent in 1985 (1985 prices). Even if part of outward FDI substituted 
for domestic investment or exports its effect on output and employment was negligible. Outward 
FDI stocks as percentage of GDP were weil below the international average, reaching hardly one 
per cent in 1989 (1985: 0.8 per cent). To provide a comparison to trade, total exports reached 
26 and imports 32 per cent of GDP in 1986. Figures on employment in Austrian subsidiaries 
abroad are available only from 1980 onwards. Tue relationship of total employment in inward and 
outward FDI ( 4,3 : 1) resembles the relationship of FDI stocks ( 1988: 5 : l ). The share of foreign 
to domestic ernployment in the manufacturing sector is about six per cent for outward and about 
27 per cent for inward FDI during the 1980s. Tue manufacturing sector employed 35,000 persons 
25 
abroad while 149,000 employees can be attributed to foreign controlled subsidiaries in Austria in 
1986. These characteristics taken together lead to the conclusion that intemationalisation during 
the pre-1987 period had little importance as to outward FDI, yet substantial importance as to 
inward FDI. On the outward side investors were concentrated in three industries (metals, 
chernicals, banking / finance / insurance accounted for 75 per cent of FDI stock) while inward 
investment was more evenly distributed among industries. Regarding overall FDI this led to an 
unbalanced development, since inward FDI grew rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s taking 
advantage of infrastructure, subsidies, political and social stability, labor cost etc. (see Tables 2 
and 3). 
Tue direction ofFDI flows of the rnanufacturing sector changed dramatically in 1986 and 
1987 when outward flows 'exploded' and exceeded inward flows. The outward stock grew at an 
average annual rate of 38 per cent, the inward stock grew only at eight per cent annually between 
1987 and 1992, with outward stocks reaching 80 per cent of inward stocks in 1992, while in 
1987 their share was only 22 per cent. Three factors lead to this process: 
( 1) Intemationalisation between 198 7-9 2 was characterised by the outsider response to 
the EC Single Market Project 1992100, which would put Austrian firms in a relatively 
disadvantageous position through entry barriers to EC markets. By far the largest part of the 
additional FDI in this period was transferred to the EC to acquire or set up firms there. Tue 
insecurity of Austria's macro-intemationalisation strategy led to an investment diversion effect, 
since the relative competitive position of Austrian firms as outsiders deteriorated relative to 
insiders with the Single Market coming into effect due to (administrative and other) barriers to 
entry. However, different industries show a different conduct during this period, depending on 
the characteristics of their production technologies. 101 
(2) Tue opening of the traditional export markets in East Europe for FDI: Naturally, the 
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central location of Austria, its neutral status in political terms as well as the structural trade- 
balance deficit with Western countries favoured trade with the East in the past. Market growth 
as weil as a 'learning-curve effect' led to increased trade and Austrian FDI in these regions. (see 
below) 
(3) The dramatic upswing of outward FDI was also caused by a few major acquisitions 
oflarge Austrian rnanufacturing firms abroad. The 20 largest manufacturing firms accounted for 
75 per cent oftotal employment abroad in 1989 according to the Central Bank (manufacturing 
sector). With 669 FDI abroad these firms had almost all of total subsidiaries of the 
manufacturing sector reported by the Central Bank in 1990 (665). 
Total FDI as percentage of exports reached 4.4 per cent in 1992 which shows the strong 
catch-up process, some of which are export substituting at an increasing proportion and value. 
Compared to domestic investment total FDJ flows reached 4.3 per cent in 1992 which is about 
four times the value of 1987 ( 1.1 per cent). Outward flows of the manufacturing sector exceeded 
inward flows in 1989 by 1.6, 1990 by 11.7, 1991 and 1992 by 8.7 bn ATS. Manufacturing 
sector's outward FDI stocks as percentage of GDP increased fivefold between 1987 and 1992 
reaching three per cent in 1992 ( 1991: 2.4 per cent; 1989: 1.0 per cent). Employment in FDI of 
the manufacturing sector abroad doubled between 1985 and 1990 (57,745; total economy: 
82,291 employees abroad). This is mainly a result of acquisition strategies rather than greenfield 
investment. Employment in inward FDI rose to 291,000 (167,000 manufacturing sector). Inward 
investment increased steadily during the period 1987-94, with the exception of 1991. Prior to 
1987 market-seeking investment dominated. From 1989 onwards finns started to rationalize their 
Europe-wide activities expecting EEA or even EC membership, efficiency-seeking motives 
dominated as well as strategic-asset seeking FDI. Vertical and horizontal mergers helped to 
increase in particular the scale and in some cases the scope of activities and enabled firrns to 
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concentrate certain activities in certain locations. The increasingly used international division of 
labour allows firms to increase their specialisation and create barriers to entry. Other motives 
were export-supporting, being present on future markets in East Europe and - of minor 
importance - cost-reducing relocations to Eastern European countries (depending on the 
productivity of the respective firm or industry). 
Internationalisation 1992 and beyond is determined by the discussion and finally the 
implementation of EU membership in 1995. The speeding-up of the macro-internationalisation 
process led to a more optimistic view ofthe markets in Western Europe than in the period before, 
when uncertainty about the participation in the EU Single Market project was high. 
Consequently, firms - now as insiders to the Single Market - started to secure 'their market share' 
by a direct presence in the EU markets mainly through acquisitions. Time piayed an important 
role, since many Austrian firms also became the target of large EU companies. The figures on 
FDI stocks and flows again show substantial growth since 1992 (see Table 3). After five years of 
substantially larger outward flows, outward and inward flows were of equal size in 1994 (see 
Table 2). lt is too early to judge if these developments are a short-term phenomenon or if it is a 
shift to a higher level of micro-internationalisation. 
Intemationalisation in Eastern Europe does not build on historic ties from the Empire anymore 
as is often maintained, but rather on strong ties from trade with the former Eastem Bloc countries 
during the times ofthe Cold War. The 'opening' of Eastern Europe in 1989 brought about one of 
the strongest shocks caused by the external environment for Austria since WWII. New chances 
and threats emerged and paralleled Austria's West European integration process thus putting 
heavy restructuring pressure on Austrian finns. 
******** Table 5a about here 
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Tue main motive for FDI in Eastern Europe is market access (72 per cent of respondents ), while 
only five per cent state low production cost as the driving force.l'" This may be explained by the 
fact that productivity is still low, hence the RULC is relatively high. The scarce data which are 
available are reported in Tables 5a-c. As Table 5a shows, the FDI stock of Austrian fums 
increased heavily from virtually zero in 1988-9 to more than 30 bn ATS in 1994. Hungary was 
by far the largest recipient country (between 60 and 70 per cent of Austrian FDI stock in Eastem 
Europe). In 1994, Hungary became the most important host country for Austrian firms (20.8 per 
cent ofFDI flows), even compared to Germany (19.8 per cent of FDI flows)! (see also Tables 5b 
and 5c) Out of the approximately 62,000 employees in Austrian FDI in Eastem Europe about 
two thirds were located in Hungary in 1992. So far, the ongoing privatisation attracted 103 firms 
with Austrian participation or 392 mn US$ or 14 per cent of the total, the number of greenfield 
investments was approximately 2,073 (!) out of 2,450 FDI (thereof 300 Austrian FDI) in 1994. 
By number, Austria was responsible for 22 per cent, by capital for 14 per cent of total FDI in 
Hungary during the first half of 1994. 
******** Tables 5b and 5c about here 
Contrary to the reluctant and slow investment in the EC, Austrian finns very quickly realised the 
potential and the chances to build on their traditional contacts and to secure very important future 
markets. The whole process was very quickly supported by an efficient risk-sharing system and 
other policy measures. Today, the know-how on East European markets accumulated in Austria 
in the past is a vital resource and a competitive advantage. 
VI 
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This article assessed two questions: First, a description of the main phases of Austrian investrnent 
and second, a preliminary discussion why in Austria - contrary to other small countries - large 
MNEs did not emerge. 
With respect to the first question, it was shown how close FDI are linked to the domestic 
performance of the economy and to the political environment. Unlike other Continental 
econornies (Gerrnany, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland) which ' ... suggest strong continuities in the 
history of continental mne'!", Austria's domestic economy reflects the case of discontinuity and 
change, which translated into the development ofher FDI. The analysis of the various stages of 
FDJ of Austrian firms (see Figure 3) showed many structural parallels that remained crucial as 
determinants for a rather long period of time, such as the importance of the banking sector as 
owner of industrial firms, the lack of risk capital, a rather high propensity to keep the location 
even if the environrilent changes (lock-in phenomenon) or the lack of a risk-taking, offensive 
entrepreneurial 'class'. Austria's FDI structure is in line with the argument that small countries 
tend to have few 'true' MNEs and they pursue a strategy of inward investrnent. Unfortunately, 
quantitative inforrnation about Austrian investment up to the l 960s is scarce both on the macro- 
level and on the micro-level, since there was no legal obligation for firms to publish about their 
FDI. 
*****Figure 3 about here 
A long-term comparison of Austria and Finland revealed how closely inward and outward FDI 
are interlinked and how their development was affected by government intervention. The 
comparison also showed that despite its large size, the Austrian internationalisation process 
before 1914 ( with probably the exception of the size of the investing finns) paralleled that of 
small countries in many respects. The change in geographical size did not affect the main 
structural features of Austrian MNEs, though it affected the level and extent of FDI. 
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Concerning the second question, some reasons for the lack oflarge MNEs, as derived in 
this paper, are: (i) Tue large home market during the Empire gave little incentive for FDI. (ii) Tue 
loss of size after WWI and the devastation of the economy again after WWII interrupted the 
growth of firms. In the inter-war period the short phases of recovery were mainly used to keep 
or restructure FDI and to some extent to engage in new ones. Like in Germany'?", the two wars 
cut-off the growth path based on FDI. Moreover, while in some countries MNEs were able to 
profit from the wars, Austrian MNEs lost throughout. (iii) Contrary to the common belief that 
during and after the destruction of the monarchy, Austrian firms lost all their FDI and had no 
incentive to invest abroad, the scarce data available and case-studies suggest that foreign 
subsidiaries were important for Austria's industrial development during all periods, the more so 
in the case the borders changed. Yet, only some actually survived. (iv) The close relationship 
between banking and industry, which was closer than in other European countries, meant that in 
the case ofbanks' crisis FDI were affected negatively, since banks tried to get rid of or bad to sell 
their capital participations. (v) Since Austrian MNEs were not substantially larger compared to 
the rest of the economy, they did not dominate the economy like e.g. Swedish firms; they could 
not anticipate the effects of WWII like, e.g. the Dutch firms; and they could not look back on 
periods of uninterrupted growth like, e.g. the large Swiss MNEs. Their relatively small size in 
international terms makes Austrian MNEs vulnerable to extemal change and less regionally 
flexible than their competitors. (vi) Tue restructuring of the economy during the inter-war period 
did not fit the historically grown structure of consumer-goods industries, but implemented large 
scale firms in investment-goods industries. This delayed the growth of FDI especially after 
WWII. (vii) The partial (after WWI) and total (after WWII) loss of markets and goodwill implied 
that Austrian firms had to start from scratch while in other countries, finns were able to keep 
their markets (e.g. Dutch MNEs). (viii) The repeated reorientation of Austrian MNEs in a 
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geographic and also structural sense from Central and East European markets implied the loss of 
traditional trade relations and was an additional burden for Austrian firms, which MNEs from 
other small countries did not have to cany at a comparable extent. (ix) The nationalisation of 
large parts of the industry after WWII which led to the largest state ownership in a Western 
economy and the reconstruction of the economy after WWII resulted in a concentration on 
domestic issues, while foreign markets were served via exporting. (x) The economic environment 
after WWII generally favoured exporting over FDI as a means of firm growth. 
Only five decades after the end of the war, a catch-up process in FDI abroad takes place. 
The macro-internationalisation of the environment, partly as a shock ( opening of Eastem 
Europe ), partly as a continuous yet uncertain integration process (EU), created a new impetus for 
offensive and defensive micro-internationalisation strategies of Austrian companies (see Figure 
1 ). The macroscopic view developed in this article also identified those aspects which merit 
further research on a micro-historical level ( e.g. to follow a firm's FDI over a period when 
political borders change; the motives of FDI; a quantitative survey of the number of FDI in 
certain benchmark years: disinvestments ). 
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TABLE l 
LARGE AUSTRIAN FIRMS WITH PRODUCTION SUBSIDIARIES 
ABROAD (Number and Percentage) 

























per cent 24.3 6.9 6.9 
Source: 
Note: 
based on F. Mathis, Big Business in Österreich II, (Oldenburg, 1990), Tables 21, 
28 and 45. 
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TABLE4 
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF AUSTRIAN FDI IN THE WEST (SHARE CAPITAL IN BN ATS AND PER 
CENT 
Year Gennany Switzerland USA Total 
Stock Share Stock Share Stock Share Stock 
1980 1.4 29.2 0.7 14.6 0.4 8.3 4.8 
1981 1.5 23.4 1.1 17.2 0.7 10.9 6.4 
1982 1.7 23.6 1.1 15.3 1.5 20.8 7.2 
1983 2.1 25.9 1.5 18.5 1.5 18.5 8.1 
1984 2.5 28.4 1.5 17.0 1.8 20.5 8.8 
1985 2.6 28.0 1.3 14.0 2.2 23„7 9.3 
1986 2.7 32.1 1.7 20.2 1.4 16. 7 8.4 
1987 4.1 38.7 2.1 19.8 1.4 13.2 10.6 
1988 4.4 34.6 2.3 18.1 1.8 14.2 12.7 
1989 5.5 32.7 3.0 17.9 1.9 11.3 16.8 
1990 6.9 24.3 4.3 15.1 2.1 7.4 28.4 
1991 8.1 21.0 4.5 11. 7 2.8 7.3 38.5 
1992 9.0 19.9 4.4 9.7 3.7 8.2 45.3 
1993 19.3 11.4 7.1 105.6 
* 
1994 24.8 11.9 7.2 122.5 
* 




*) extrapolated by balance of payments data (share capital + balance of profits and losses carried forward + 
balance of long tenn, since 1989 also short terrn, loans) 






















o. V) o. 
r- 
N 





































00 0 0 N 
0 
0 
~ "' 1 ·5 r-- °' ~ °' 0 lr) o:i o:i 0 
0 













Cl z M 0 00 0 0 < eil 00 °' 00 "<I' N r-- 0 o:i 
lr) M 00 0 r-- 0 








VJ "' 0 w ·5 0 0 M > 0 lr) N 0 "<I' "<I' °' o:i o:i °' 0 0 
r-- 0 
(/J 0 lr) N. 0 °' lr) N M 0 N ~ ::l V) N° '° '° lr) M d d 00 r-- < M 
f- u ... 
~ 1l E 0 ::l 
z z c., ~ lr) N "<I' "! o:i "<I' 'SI" 0 0 
~ 
0 N "<I' 0 d N 0 C 
0 ..... 
0 °' 00 lr) r-- r-- 00 0 0 0 73 0 lr) °' 00 0 
0 0 0 0 
o. N. M M "<I' '° o:i o:i 00 0 "<I'. N N. 8 M '° N, '° d d '° 
N '° lr) ,,., oc '° '° N° N N ,,., M N lr) 
s 
§ 0 :.0::: r/J ~ 
eil 
0 




















































• r:.,pm1i11g / lmro„th1g 
• ,..f)/ 
Macro 
• c,,.Hnm.i Union 
• Free Trade Agreemen: 




• belance o( f"l)'mtnll 
·•~ymmt 
• in\"Nlmfflt 
• T~rnu er Tnde .... 
•lif""(illinlion 
• imov.lion 
• produc t lf"fliona l 
6iwniricalion 
•~No(tc.a lt 
• marhtJ'O"" ff 
•ll..t D . ... 
barriers 
• inve,tmmt 







• tc0n0miH of aule 




MAP OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY 
U N G :A 


























"' " Q. e ::s w 








































"' "' '§ ~ ~·= o.i + 
"' c ,., 
E 
vi 






" ~ ,., 
> ·= "E (/J V, 
~ t:: t: 
~ 0 O 
'5 s' ~ 
0 ·- ,u 
"' c ,., 
E 
vi 
























Q. :.a ~ 







Q. e ::s w 







1. C. Beliale, 'Foreign Direct Investment From Small States and Integration - Micro- and Macroeconomic Evidence 
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Rise of Multinationals; H.G. Schröter, Aufstieg der Kleinen: Multinationale Unternehmen aus fünf kleinen Staaten 
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Dunning) which gives figures as early as 1914. They also highlight the deficiencies and problems related to early 
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23. Mathis, Big Business II, p.98. 
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25. Based on an interview with Schrack, Dir. Sven U. Stengl, by this author in 1988 and company records . 
26. Based on an interview by this author in 1988. 
27. See for an english version of the Bö hier case in Schröter, 'Mentality', p.218f. 
28. Based on an interview by this author in 1988. 
29. Based on firm infonnation. 
30. There is also a fourth group of Austrian MNEs, which is ofless interest here, namely Austrianfirms which are 
founded a.fter WWJJ and engaged in FDJ: AMAG (aluminium); EMCO (machine tools); Grass (metal); Hirsch (leather 
and plastics); Zumtobel (light systems etc.). See Bellak et al., Intemationalisierungsstrategien, for details. 
31. Schröter, Aufstieg, pp.172 and 175. 
32. See also Mathis, Big Business II, and Matis, 'Disintegration'. 
33. Schröter, Aufstieg, pp.236 and 249. 
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36. Bellak, Luostarinen, Small and Open. 
37. R. Hjerppe and J. Ahvenainen, 'Foreign enterprises and nationalistic control: the case of Finland since the end of 
the nineteenth century', in A. Teichova, M. Levy-Leboyer and H. Nussbaum (eds.), Multinational enterprise in 
historical perspective, pp.286-98. 
38. Bellak and Lusotarinen, Small and Open. 
39. H. Matis, 'Disintegration and Multi-national Enterprises in Central Europe during the Post-war Years ( 1918-23)', 
in A. Teichova and P.L. Cottrell ( eds) International Business and Central Europe (Leicester, Leicester UP, 1983), 
p.92 quotes the example ofthe Alpine Montan Company, Austria's largest industrial firm in the inter-war period, where 
Italian finns bought a stake: 'This transaction constituted the first major inroad of foreign capital into Austrian industry.' 
Yet, foreign influence over Austrian industrial finns was also gained indirectly through Viennese banks (ibid., p.93). 
40. Mathis, 'Foreign Investment', p.74. 
41. This is subject to further research on the micro-level. 
42. Calculated from Mathis, 'Foreign Investment', pp.94 and 97. 
43. Some ofthe principles were even valid until the early 1990s, see Bellak and Luostarinen, Small and Open. 
44. (translated, C.B.) Schröter, Aufstieg, p.156. 
45. Hjerppe and Ahvenainen, 'Foreign Enterprises', p.288. 
46. Ibid., p.288. 
47. Bellak and Luostarinen, Small and Open. 
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48. The comparison can, for the Jack of quantitative data, only be done on a qualitative level. 
49. Schröter, Aufstieg, p.55. 
50. Schröter, Aufstieg, terms this fact after M. Wilkins the 'nearby factor'. See also Schröter, 'Mentality'. He points out 
that the nearby countries for Austria changed significantly: 'Up to 1914 Russia is included and between 1919 and 1939, 
Yougoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovak.ia as weil.' (p.2 I 1, FN I 9) 
51. Schröter, Aufstieg, p.263 presents two quotes about Sweden and the decisive role of extemal financing. 
52. 'The reason for (the importance of FDI over backward and forward integration as suggested in Chandler's growth 
model ofthe firm, C.B.) is tobe found in the limited market size. Consequently, for such finns, growth was bound to 
FDI in very early stages already.' (Schröter, Aufstieg, p.221) Schröter does not discuss alternatives here, especially 
exporting, which are dealt with in a subsequent chapter (ibid., p.319) and which were not feasable in many cases. 
53. Schröter, Aufstieg, p.222. 
54. lbid., pp.331 and 336. 
55. See also Jones and Schröter, Rise of Multinationals, p.21 ff for a similar argument. 
56. H. Matis, 'Disintegration' and Butschek, Österreichische Wirtschaft. 
57. E.g., K.W. Rothschild, 'Size and Viability: The Lesson of Austria', in E.A.G. Robinson (ed.), Economic 
Consequences of the Size of Nations, (Macmillan, London, 1963), Ch. 10, pp.168-8 I. 
58. Rothschild, 'Size and Viability', p. 168. 
59. Matis, 'Disintegration', p.74 reports 'that there was the widespread feeling ofhaving been deprived ofthe most 
valuable resources'. Butschek, Öste1reichische Wirtschaft, writes that the eagemess of firms to invent new products and 
the willingness to compete for new markets was rather limited. 
60. Matis, ibid., mentions that the index ofindustrial production rose by 146 per cent between 1920-29 and that the 
'Alpine Republic's industrial upswing quite easily kept pace with the development in Czechoslovakia' (p. 78). Yet, the 
economic crisis of 1929 hit Austria hard and it was 'not until 1950 (that, C.B.) the industrial sector (did, C.B.) regain 
the significant place in the creation ofthe national product that it occupied in 1913.' A. Mosser and A. Teichova, 
'Investment behaviour of industrial joint-stock companies and industrial shareholding by the Österreichische Credit- 
Anstalt: inducement or obstacle to renewal and change of industry in interwar Austria, in H. James, H. Lindgren and 
A. Teichova ( eds), The rote of banks in the interwar economy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991 ), 
p.123. 
61. F. Butschek, 'The Rebirth of the Austrian Economy after WWII - The Case of Discontinuity', in J. Kornlos ( ed.) 
Economic Development in the Habsburg monarchy andin the successor states, East European Monographs, No. 
CCLXXX (Columbia UP, New York, 1990), p.286. 
62. This is proven by the high per capita income and by the fact that industry accounted for 37.8 per cent of national 
income and employed 35.6 per cent ofthe Iabour force. 
63. Butschek, Österreichische Wirtschaft. 
64. Matis, 'Disintegration', p.78. 
65. Mosser and Teichova, 'Investment behaviour', p. I 34. 
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66. 'From the standpoint of trade policy, the main difference between the Austria's of 1913 and after 1918 was that the 
latter no longer formed part of an economically autarkic, almost completely self-sufficient tenitory. The abrupt switch 
for Austrian industry from supplying a protected inland market to entering into the competition-ridden field of extemal 
trade constituted the main problem.' (Matis, 'Disintegration', p.82) 
67. See e.g., H. Kernbauer and F. Weber, 'Multinational banking in the Danube basin: the business strategy of the 
Viennese banks after the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy', in Teichova, Levy-Leboyer and Nussbaum, 
Multinational Enterprise, pp.185-99 for a similar argument for banks, which adopted a similar strategy to keep their 
pre-War branches. See also: A. Mosser, 'Financing industrial companies in interwar Austria: working capital and 
liquidity', in A. Teichova, T. Gourvish and A. Pogany (eds.), Universalbanking in the twentieth century (Edward 
Elgar, Bodmin, 1994), pp.208-14. 
68. With regard to banks, Kernbauer and Weber, 'Multinational banking', conclude that the number of branches of the 
1 O largest Viennese banks situated outside of the Austrian republic was reduced from 143 in 1918 to nine in 1923.' 
(p.187) This resulted in the loss ofthe banks' in.fluence on manufacturing industry abroad. Matis ('Disintegration', pp.86 
and 92) points to the close relationship between banking and industry also quoting A. Teichova. See below for the 
success ofthe manufacturing sector. 
69. Based on Mathis, Big Business, Tables 3 and 4. 
70. Schröter, 'Mentality', p.12. 
71. Butschek, Österreichische Wirtschaft, pp.26 and 44. 
72. Mathis, Big Business ll, p.127. 
73. Matis, 'Disintegration', p.74. 
74. lbid., p.80. 
75. lbid., p.81. 
76. bid., p.81. 
77.1 The sample contains only finns that existed before November 1918, which both had their head offices on the 
tenitory ofthe future Austrian Republic and capital participations in the successor states. Matis, 'Disintegration', p.82, 
mentions the restricted size of the sample, but maintains that 'the range of 50 enterprises should provide enough 
evidence ofany general trend. Examples offirms surveyed include the Silesia Bergbau AG, the Bleiberger Bergwerks 
Union, Jungbunzlauer, Elin AG, Feiten and Guilleaume. Holzhandels AG and Vöslauer Kammgarnfabrik. The 
question raised above is subject to further research on the micro-level still. 
78. Matis qualifies his results critically: 'Of course, an approach to the problem of capital connections between the 
private economies of Austria and the successor states like the one above can only produce superficial results. The 
statement that 70 per cent of the companies, having turned into 'multi-nationals' after the breakup of 1918 in an 
undefined way, were still under the in.fluence ofVienna, is ofno significant value. lt can for the moment only be viewed 
as a general hypothesis, which requires verification through further detailed research' (Disintegration', p.85). 
79. 'Furthermore, industrial production showed an increase ofroughly one third as compared to 1932; this, however, 
equalled only 80 per cent ofthe 1929 production.' (R. Bardy, 'Die österreichische Wirtschaft während des Zweiten 
Weltkriegs (Ein Überblick)' (The Austrian Economy during the Second World War - A Survey), Österreich in 
Geschichte und Literatur, Vol.10, No.5 ( 1966), p.213). 
80. E.g., the Reichswerke 'Hermann Göring' with the help of Dresdner and Deutsche Bank bought up the major 
Austrian business on its behalf, gradually acquiring ownership of the major iron, steel and machinery sectors, 
including Steyr-Daimler Puch and the Alpine Montangesellschaft; JG Farben acquired ownership from the 
Rothschilds of the Skoda Werke; Dynamit took over two Austrian chernical works iCarbidwerke Deutsch-Matrei and 
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Österreichische Dynamit Nobel AG in 1938; Krupp increased its participation in Bemdorfer Metallwarenfabrik; and 
the Stahlverein in Böhler AG. Based on Overy, R.J., 'German multinationals and the Nazi state in occupied Europe', 
in Teichova, Levy-Leboyer and Nussbaum ( eds) Multinational enterprise in historical perspective, pp.301-3. 
81. 'The Gennan state also enjoyed the advantage that significant shareholdings had been sold by private owners to the 
Austrian and Czech States in anticipation ofGerman expansion, which were simply bought up on very favourable terms 
by the Gennan state when Austria and Czechoslovakia ceased to exist as souvereign units.' (Overy, 'Nazi state', p.304) 
82. 'lt rnight even be said that in some sectors a certain 'company formation boom' took force which otherwise would 
have developed but slowly in Austria due to the hesitant position taken by Austrian entrepreneurs and the long years 
ofeconornic stagnation.' (Bardy, 'Überblick, p.530). ' ... the expansion process per se was a very lopsided one, favouring 
sectors important to war preparations and later to the war itself, i.e. the energy sector; raw material production and 
heavy industry. The consumption-oriented industries, such as the paper, leather, textile and clothing industries and 
tourism, experienced these upward tendencies to a much lower degree.' (lbid., p.536) 
83. Bardy ('Überblick', p.538) compares the share oflarge-scale enterprises in the Viennese basin during the Empire 
(90 per cent) with that of 1945 (about 30 per cent). 
84. U. Olsson, 'Securing the markets. Swedish multinationals in a historical perspective', in Jones and Schröter, Rise 
of Multinationals, emphasises 'that the effects of the world wars must be kept in mind when discussing the history of 
the mnes in different countries; certainly the confiscation of foreign assets during the wars has been an important factor 
for the German industry as weil as for the British. Swiss and Swedish mnes, based in neutral countries, have normally 
been spared from such experiences' (p. l 05). 
85. Butschek, Österreichische Wirtschaft, p.72. (translated, C.B.) 
86. I refer to the weil known USIA concem which consisted of 300 manufacturing firms, had 55,000 employees and 
produced an output worth about 5 per cent of GNP. The USIA concem must thus be viewed as an inward FDI, as long 
as the Russians owned it. Contrary to the property ofthe other Allies, the USIA concem was not Austrian owned. While 
the former had a favourable effect for the Austrian economy, the latter did not. Negative effects for Austria resulted from 
a loss oftaxes, decrease ofdomestic supply since output was exported, profit transfer abroad etc. and created a climate 
of uncertainty for private domestic investors. 
87. Cf. Bellak, 'Entwicklungen' and Bellak, 'Small States'. 
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